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Supplement U tax if derived from dividends, interest, annuities, royal-
ties, rents, gains from the sale of property, or research.22 Such income
is not taxable because it is considered to be passive in nature and not
to have a harmful effect on competition.
23
The new law does not deprive an organization of its tax exemption
or require it to dispose of its unrelated business.2 4 The tax is imposed
only on unrelated business income in excess of $1,00025 The related
income of an exempt organization will continue to be exempt as under
the old law.
26
The new tax became effective with taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950.27 Organizations taxable as corporations will pay
the normal rate of 25 per cent on their unrelated business income and
a surtax of 20 per cent on such income over $25,000 ;2 however, these
rates may be changed by current legislation proposing increases in cor-
poration tax rates and an excess profits tax. Organizations taxable as
trust will be taxed at the same rate as individuals.2 Also of importance
is the fact that the tax is imposed on the net unrelated income in order
that losses on one unrelated venture may be offset against gains on
another30
RobERT M. WmaLY.
Torts--Malpractice--Liability of Physician for Acts of Substitute
The liability of a physician1 to a patient for malpractice is dependent
upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship, or upon a relation-
ship based on contract. Absent a special contract to the contrary, a
physician-patient relationship is brought into existence upon acceptance
of the patient for treatment, and such relationship may be terminated
by mutual consent, dismissal of the physician by the patient, determina-
tion by the physician that his services are no longer needed, or reason-
able notice to the patient in order that that patient may have an
22'1T. REv. CODE §422(a). Rents from real property (including personal
property leased with real property) are excluded from the Supplement U Tax.
However, income from a lease of a term of five years or more will be taxed in
the proportion that any unpaid debt on the rented property at the close of the
taxable year bears to the adjusted basis of such property. A gain from the sale
of property is defined as property other than stock in trade or property held for
sale to customers. Research, as used in this section is defined as research per-
formed for the United States or its agencies, or any state or subdivision thereof,
research performed by any university or hospital for any person, and research
done for any person by an organization designed to carry on fundamental research
if the results are made available to the public.
"SE. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1950).
SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1950).
2INT. REv. CODE §421(c). qINT. REv. CODE §421 (b) (1).
'IxT. REV. CODE §421(a). '8INT. REv. CODE §421(a)(1).
"INT. REv. CODE §421(a) (2). "INT. Rv. CODE §422 (a) (6).
Reference to physicians throughout this article also includes surgeons.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
opportunity to engage the services of another 2 It has also been held,
though there is little authority on the point, that a physician, who
possesses no peculiar personal qualifications and no special knowledge
of the patient's malady, may discharge his patient by substituting in
his place another physician who possesses a proper amount of skill and
is a duly careful person.3 This seems tb be the gtneral rule and a
substitution under these circumstances severs the phytician-patient re-
lationship between the first physician and his patient, and thereby
relieves the first physician of liability for the negligence or malpractice
of the substitute. But where the substitution is not made in accordance
with this rule, liability may be incurred by the first physician for the
negligence of the substitute.
This question of liability of a physician for the acts of a substitute
physician arose in the early North Carolina case of Nash v. Royster.
4
There, after an operation, the attending physician left town for a period
of two weeks and upon leaving, turned his patient over to the care of
another physician without notice to, or the consent of, the patient. In
an action brought against the first physician for the negligence of the
substitute, the court held that a physician is not liable for the acts of a
substitute physician, unless the substitute acts as his agent in perform-
ing the service, or due care is not exercised in selecting the substitute.
The case further held that neither the consent of the patient, nor the
lack of consent, is the determining factor as to whether the relation of
principal and agent existed between the two physicians, but whether
agency in fact had been created was to be determined by the relations
actually existing between the parties under their agreements or acts.
In a leading case on this question, the Texas court declared that the
substitute was in effect an independent contractor, reasoning that the
nature of his work required him to exercise his own judgment ant
skill.5 A similar result was reached in a New Jersey case,8 where it
was pointed out that no business relation existed between the two.
physicians and emphasis was placed on the distinct and independent
character of the substitute's work.
It has been said that where one desiring to employ another to per-
form a service in his stead is obliged by law to employ a licensed person
2 Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N. W. 762 (1935); Grove v. Myers,
224 N. C. 165, 29 S. E. 2d 553 (1944) ; Swan, The California Law of Malpractice
of Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 248 (1945); see Note,
56 A. L. R. 818 (1928).
" Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S. W. 927 (1920) ; Myers v. Hol-
burn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 33 Atl. 389 (1895); Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127
S. E. 356 (1925); Lee v. Moore, 162 S. W. 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); see
Notes, 21 R. C. L. 395 (1918); 46 A. L. R. 1154 (1927).
'Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127 S. E. 256 (1925).
'Lee v. Moore, 162 S. W. 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
Myers v. Holburn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 33 AtI. 389 (1895).
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(as is the case with physicians), he is not responsible for the negligent,
defective, or improper execution of the work of such person as the
relation of master and servant does not exist This, however, seems
to be too broad a rule. Although it may indicate, as in any other case
in which skill is involved, that such master and servant relationship is
not contemplated, the relationship may in fact exist. This is true even
though the law requires the selection of persons for the particular work
to be made from a limited class, irrespective of how limited the class
may be.8 The question of whether agency in fact existed is one for the
jury to determine upon a consideration of the relations actually existing
between the parties under their agreements or acts in the light of local
custom.9
The general rule that a physician must exercise due care in selection
of a substitute was recognized in Nash v. Royster.10 In a Nebraska
case'1 where a physician with thirty years specialized practice turned
his patient over to a substitute physician of only four years experience,
the principal physician was held liable on grounds of abandonment. It
was pointed out by the court that the patient was in fact employing a
specialist, and for the principal physician to substitute another physician
of little experience without notice to or agreement by the patient was a
violation of duty and abandonment of the case. It would seem that
under the rule of Nash v. Royster requiring the exercise of due care in
the selection of a substitute, North Carolina might reach the same result
as the Nebraska case.
An analogous problem arises as to the liability of non-charitable
12
hospitals for the negligence and malpractice of physicians of the hospital.
It seems that here though, a special situation is confronted in which
liability arises out of contract and depends on whether the hospital has
undertaken responsibility for the part of the treatment in which the
Myers v. Holburn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 33 Atl. 389 (1895) ; Woon, MASTER AND
SERVANT §311 (1877).8 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §223 (1933).
'Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127 S. E. 356 (1925); Tetting v. Hotel
Pfister, 221 Wis. 141, 266 N. W. 249 (1936) (Defendant hotel did not ask to
have submitted to the jury any question of fact with reference to the status of
employment of a masseur, who, while an employee of the hotel, rendered negligent
treatment to a customer; but on appeal contended that as a rule of law a licensed
masseur cannot be a servant because the law requires his selection to be from a
limited class and that such employees are not subject to control as to the details
of their work. Held: That this is not a rule of law which would preclude the
conclusion that a masseur may be a servant or agent.). In determining whether
one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, see RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY §220 (1933).
10 See note 4 supra.
't Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 220 N. W. 247 (1928).
"Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914) (charitable institutions
are exempt from liability under a special doctrine of public policy) ; Note, 19
N. C. L. Yv. 245 (1941).
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negligence occurred.'2 Where the hospital admits patients for treat-
ment and the patient chooses his own physician, or where the hospital
only acts as an agency for recommending or employing such physician,
the hospital has been held not liable for the negligence or malpractice
of such physician. But it may be liable for negligence in recommending
or selecting such physician.14 When the hospital contracts to render a
certain treatment, or to perform a particular operation for a contracted
price, and then undertakes to perform its part of the contract through
its own physician employees, the physicians may be liable for their own
negligence or malpractice, and the hospital may incur liability predicated
upon contract.15 Under the same doctrine it has been held that a
company or employer who agrees to furnish medical benefits to its
employees is liable only for the negligent appointment of a physician.' 6
But in some jurisdictions where the employer contracts to furnish medi-
cal benefits, and then attempts to furnish such treatment in its own
company hospital or infirmary and through its own company physician
employees, the employer has been held liable on the same basis as hos-
pitals which incur liability by contract.17
While it is true a physician may incur liability by contract, in addi-
tion to liability for his own negligence or malpractice, the physician-
patient relationship does not necessarily rest on contract.1 8 , The
physician may render his services gratuitously,' or at the request of
some third person for the benefit of the third person only ;20 but the
physician will still be liable to the patient because of the physician-
patient relationship.2 ' Where there is no specific contract between the
patient and physician to the contrary, the physician does not guarantee
to effect a cure,22 nor is he obliged to stay on the case until his services
13 See Note, 4 A. L. R. 191 (1919).
a' Robinson v. Cratwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911) ; Smith v. Duke Uni-
versity, 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643 (1941); Penland v. Hospital, 199 N. C.
314, 154 S. E. 406 (1930) ; Johnson v. Hospital, 196 N. C. 610, 146 S. E. 573
(1929) ; see Note, 22 A. L. R. 346 (1923).
" Brown v. La Socidt6 Francaise, 138 Cal. 475, 71 Pac. 516 (1903) ; Jenkins
v. Charleston Gen. Hospital, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560 (1922) ; see Smith v.
Duke University, 219 N. C. 628, 635, 14 S. E. 2d 643, 648 (1941) ; see Note, 22
A. L. R. 346 (1923).
" McMahan v. Spruce Co., 180 N. C. 636, 105 S. E. 439 (1920); Woody v.
Spruce Co., 176 N. C. 643, 97 S. E. 610 (1918); Barden v. R. R., 152 N. C.
318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
" Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F. 2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947); Kain
v. Ariz. Copper Co., 14 Ariz. 566, 133 Pac4 412 (1913) ; see Note, 33 A. L. R.
1193 (1924)..
8 Thaggard v. Vales, 218 Ala, 603, 119 So. 647 (1928) ; Du Bois v. Decker,
130 N. Y. 325, 29 N. E. 313 (1891) ; People v. Murphey, 101 N. Y. 126, 4 N. E.
326 (1886) ; see Note, 21 R. C. L. 375 (1918).
' Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 603, 119 So. 647 (1928); Du Bois v. Decker,
130 N. Y. 325, 29 N. E. 313 (1891).
20 People v. Murphey, 101 N. Y. 126, 4 N. E. 326 (1886).
• See note 19 supra.
22 Davis v. Pittman, 212 N. C. 680, 194 S. E. 97 (1937) ; Pendergraft v. Royster.
203 N. C. 384, 166 S. E. 285 (1932), Note, 19 N. C. L. Rv. 617 (1941).
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
are no longer needed. He may release himself, as has been noted, by
giving sufficient notice to the patient to secure the services of another,28
or by turning the case over to another physician, provided of course, he
exercises due care in selecting such substitute.
24
As a generalization, then, it seems that the prevailing view, with
which North Carolina is apparently in accord, is that a physician or
surgeon can relieve himself of liability for the negligent acts and omis-
sions of a substitute physician or surgeon, provided: (1) he is under
no contract which wpuld create greater liability than that which rises
out of the mere physician and patient relationship, (2) -due care is
exercised in selecting such substitute, (3) by the relations actually
existing among the parties under their agreements or acts, agency be-
tween the physicians in fact did not exist.
HUGH P. FORTESCUE, JR.
Torts-Negligence--Intervening Criminal Act
When the deceased entered the defendant's store, the defendant's
fourteen-year-old son pulled a pistol from under the counter and pointed
it at the deceased. Though requested to put it away, he discharged it,
inflicting a fatal wound.
A suit was instituted for the wrongful death against both the de-
fendant and his son. The plaintiff alleged that the 'defendant, who
knew that his son had brandished the pistol at other customers, was
negligent in leaving the pistol where his son could obtain possession of
the dangerous instrumentality. It was further alleged that the son
maliciously shot the deceased and also that the son's act was negligent.
The Georgia court held that the demurrer as to the defendant should
have been sustained since the son's intervening act was criminal and
superseded the defendant's negligence. As to the son, the court said
a cause of action, in negligence, had been stated.,
The statement of the general rule applicable to such cases, that a
subsequent, independent and unforeseeable criminal or negligent act
supersedes the original party's negligence and renders that party not
liable, is followed by the Georgia court. Whether stated in terms of
liability or non-liability for intervening acts, the problem of these cases
is not the statement of the rule but rather the application of the rule
to the facts of a particular case.
The case did not reach a jury, and the holding of the Georgia court
is partially explainable under peculiar local rules of pleading. When a
petition is attacked by demurrer in that state, the facts alleged are taken
2 See note 2 .supra. 2 See note 3 supra.
1 Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694 (1950).
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